

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

ACDA-19 DRC-01 /164 W

----- 112203

R 281807Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6717

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

SECDEF

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 15200

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR-UK ANALYSIS OF WARSAW PACT COMMENTS ON  
MAJOR ELEMENTS OF NATO PROPOSALS

1. TICKELL HAS GIVEN US A COPY OF AN ANALYSIS OF  
WARSAW PACT COMMENTS ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF NATO PRO-  
POSALS PREPARED RECENTLY BY UKDEL IN VIENNA. TICKELL  
SAID HE THOUGHT US AUTHORITIES MIGHT BE INTERESTED TO  
READ THIS ANALYSIS. HE SAID THAT FOREIGN OFFICE HAD  
NOT GIVEN FORMAL ENDORSEMENT TO THE PAPER BUT OBSERVED  
THAT "IT MAKES GOOD SENSE." COPIES OF PAPER BEING  
POUCHED TO DEPARTMENT AND US NATO. TICKELL SAID HE  
WOULD GIVE COPY TO DEAN DECEMBER 29 WHEN LATTER STOPS  
OFF BRIEFLY IN LONDON FOR INFORMAL TALK ON MBFR. CON-  
CLUSIONS OF ANALYSIS FOLLOW BELOW.

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2. BEGIN TEXT CONCLUSIONS.6.IT CANNOT BE DENIED THAT

THERE HAVE BEEN ONE OR TWO COMMENTS FROM THE EAST DURING BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS WHICH COULD INDICATE THAT THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A C\*NCEPT OF PHASING NEARER TO THE WESTERN IDEA THAN TO THE IDEA OF STAGED IMPLEMENTATION CONTAINED IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME (AND LEAVING ASIDE THE POLISH "PERSONAL OPINION") THERE IS PERHAPS SOME SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FACT THAT THE ONLY TWO COMMENTS SPECIFICALLY TO SUGGEST A HINT OF FLEXIBILITY HAVE BEEN MADE BY KVITSINSKY TO DEAN. THE OTHER COMMENTS, PRINCIPALLY THOSE MADE BY KHLESTOV, SEEMED DESIGNED MORE WITH THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING OUT WESTERN DELEGATES AS TO NATO'S IDEAS ON TIMING AND CONTENT OF PHASE 2. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE EAST IS HINTING AT SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINT. ONE COULD EQUALLY WELL ARGUE THAT THEIR PURPOSE IN POSING THESE QUESTIONS AND DROPPING THESE HINTS IS TO SEE WHETHER ON THIS PARTICULAR ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN THE US AND ITS ALLIES; OR (AND THIS IS PERHAPS MORE LIKELY) SIMPLY TO BE ABLE TO TAKE BACK TO MOSCOW AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ABOUT NATO THINKING ON THE SECOND PHASE. BASED ON EXPERIENCE AT THE EXPLORATORY TALKS, ONE MIGHT ALSO INFER THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION ARRIVED IN VIENNA WITH FIRM INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE GENERAL LINE TO TAKE (AS WELL, OF COURSE, AS THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT), BUT THAT THOSE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL CONCERNING POSSIBLE WESTERN PROPOSALS AND WHAT MIGHT BE OR COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED FROM THOSE PROPOSALS.

7. MORE INTRIGUING ARE THE SOVIET BILATERAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. ONE COULD READ INTO THE COMMENTS THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DEAL IN WHICH THE EAST WOULD AGREE TO THE CONCEPT (UNDERLINED) OF A COMMON CEILING (BUT NOT TO OUR ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURE OF 700,000) IN RETURN FOR THE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. THIS IS PERHAPS NOT SURPRISING SINCE THE EAST ARGUES THAT THE WEST ENJOYS AN ADVANTAGE IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.

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8. ONE IMPORTANT POINT SHOULD BE BORNE MIND. THE SOVIET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS MOVES VERY SLOWLY IN-DEED. IT COULD HARDLY HAVE HAD TIME SINCE WE IN THE WEST FIRST STARTED DEVELOPING OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS TO CONSIDER OUR CONCEPTS OF PHASING AND OF A COMMON CEILING, AND TO REACT TO THE EXTENT OF INSTRUCTING THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO DISPLAY HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY. NOR IS IT LIKELY (SEE PARA 6 ABOVE) THAT THE SOVIET DELE-GATION COULD HAVE ARRIVED IN VIENNA WITH INSTRUCTIONS AS TO HYPOTHETICAL POINTS ON WHICH THEY MIGHT INDICATE FLEXIBILITY WERE THE WEST TO RAISE THEM. THIS IS NOT HOW SOVIET INSTRUCTIONS SEEM NORMALLY TO BE FORMULATED. IF THESE TWO ASSUMPTIONS ARE CORRECT, IT LENDS WEIGHT TO THE ARGUMENT THAT WHAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION (AND OTHERS ON THE EASTERN SIDE) HAVE BEEN CONCERNED TO DO IN BILATERAL CONTACTS IS TO ELICIT AS MUCH INFORMATION AS THEY CAN FROM WESTERN DELEGATES CONCERNING THOSE ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSALS WHICH WERE NOT FULLY DEVELOPED

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IN THE OUTLINE TABLED ON 22 NOVEMBER. THEIR AGREEMENT WITH SOME ALACRITY TO A LENGTHY RECESS (IN FACT REQUESTING A ONE WEEK EXTENSION OF THE PERIOD PROPOSED BY NATO) MAY BE AN INDICATION THAT THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THEY HAVE AS MUCH OF THIS UNPUBLISHED INFORMATION AS THEY CAN OBTAIN AT THIS STAGE AND THAT THIS WILL NEED PROLONGED GESTATION IN EASTERN CAPITALS. WHETHER THIS MAY BE A HINT THAT THEY SEE POSSIBLE AREAS OF COMPROMISE, OR POINTS ON WHICH A PACKAGE DEAL MIGHT BE MADE, IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY. CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE READING TOO MUCH INTO BILATERAL COMMENTS TO SUGGEST THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE A DEAL BY AGREEING TO LIMIT PHASE 1 REDUCTIONS TO US AND SOVIET FORCES IN RETURN FOR A FIRM COMMITMENT REGARDING THE LINK WITH A SECOND PHASE IN WHICH EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE ADDRESSED, ITS TIMING AND POSSIBLY ITS CONTENTS. END TEXT.

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